TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/051589/05158900.045

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                                                                                NATION, Page 22

COVER STORIES: Do-Nothing Detente


George Bush finally thinks he has a policy toward Moscow --
hang tough and see what happens -- but U.S. allies fear he is
missing a historic chance

By George J. Church


    In the 3 1/2 months since George Bush's Inauguration, the world
has been waiting to discover what attitude the new U.S.
Administration would adopt toward the extraordinary events in the
Soviet Union. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze have continued their odysseys through world
capitals, proclaiming the promise of perestroika and the end of
ideological conflict. All the while, the White House has turned
away questions -- whether from allies, Soviets or the American
press -- with the explanation that a sweeping policy review was
under way.

    Now, with Washington and its NATO partners openly quarreling
about whether to negotiate with the Soviets on reductions in
short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the U.S. policy review is
almost completed, and Secretary of State James Baker is due to drop
the first authoritative hints on a two-day visit to Moscow this
week. Shevardnadze was set to receive him eagerly on Wednesday and
to usher Baker into a private room with Gorbachev on Thursday.

    What Baker has to say, however, is likely to displease severely
not only Moscow but also some U.S. allies, and an influential
segment of American and European public opinion. The Secretary will
propose a date, probably in June, for resuming the START
negotiations on reducing strategic nuclear weapons. But otherwise
Baker has no major U.S. initiatives to announce and no plans to
match, let alone top, Gorbachev's innumerable catchy detente
proposals.

    This diplomatic vacuum is quite deliberate. Many aspects of
American policy are still under debate; for example, Washington
has not yet decided what changes, if any, to make in the framework
for a start treaty that was all but agreed to by Gorbachev's and
Ronald Reagan's negotiators. But the Administration's central theme
is reasonably clear. In essence, George Bush proposes to stand pat
and wait for Gorbachev to make the next move -- and probably the
one after that and the one after that -- toward reducing tensions.
As one senior American official puts it, the idea is to "let
Gorbachev keep coming to us, making concessions, playing to our
agenda."

    And if the Soviet leader won't play? Then, in the view of many
critics in the U.S. and abroad, Washington will have missed a
historic opportunity to end the cold war and begin moving the
relations between the nuclear superpowers from competition to
cooperation. And, some of the staunchest U.S. allies add, George
Bush will have abdicated the leadership role the world has a right
to expect from the President of the U.S.

    Bush is "firm in his belief that a new President shouldn't go
off half-cocked," says a senior White House aide. "He has
repeatedly said, `I'm not going to make one of those big early-term
mistakes like the Bay of Pigs.' " Yet faced with a political
upheaval in the Soviet Union and its spillover in Europe, Bush
seems almost recklessly timid, unwilling to respond with the
imagination and articulation that the situation requires. "He is
supposed to lead, but he is not even really trying yet," complains
a British diplomat.

    The Administration is convinced that Gorbachev has not yet gone
far enough in toning down the Soviet Union's aggressive
international behavior to make bold American initiatives
worthwhile. In a speech last week Baker praised the Soviets for
such moves as pulling their army out of Afghanistan and beginning
unilateral cuts in European tank and troop strength. But he also
complained that in other ways, Soviet actions do not match
Gorbachev's pledges of "new thinking." For example, he chastised
Moscow for stepping up aid to Nicaragua and continuing to produce
five times as many tanks as the U.S. Though Baker specifically
denied any U.S. intention to "sit tight and await Soviet
concessions," he went on to outline an approach that sounded
exactly like that: "Our policy must be . . . to test the
application of Soviet `new thinking' again and again" with a view
to determining "whether the new thinking is real once we probe
behind the slogans."

    To the extent that U.S. policy is changing, Bush is subtly but
surely shifting to a harder line than the Reagan Administration
followed. Not with any great consistency, however; in the absence
of a clear lead from the President, various officials have been
filling the air with words and actions that send out clashing
signals as to just how tough the Administration means to be. Some
examples:

    The President last week overrode a National Security Council
recommendation, and his own general opposition to farm-trade
supports, to approve a federally subsidized sale of $250 million
worth of American wheat to the Soviet Union. But according to
farm-state Congressmen, he made the $12 million subsidy available
on only half the wheat the Soviets wanted to buy. The White House
denies that, but such a move would be a typical Bush half-a-loaf
compromise between the views of the Agriculture Department, which
wants to assist U.S. farmers in competing against European export
subsidies, and the NSC, which contends that the U.S. should not
help Gorbachev solve his economic problems lest he be spared the
choice between guns and butter.

    Almost simultaneously, say some Congressmen and agribusiness
executives, the Administration quietly shelved a Soviet request to
buy U.S. soybean oil for the first time. The Soviets offered to
purchase 200,000 tons, worth $120 million, using subsidies extended
to other buyers of U.S. surplus soybean oil. Says one agribusiness
executive: "What Gorbachev wants to do is fill up his stores and
put something on the shelves fast. A housewife who can't find
cooking oil is in a hell of a fix." This expert insists that the
White House has nixed the sale, and adds, "Gorbachev is going to
view it as a hostile act."

    Two senior Administration officials inferentially warned
against rushing into agreements predicated on the idea that
Gorbachev will succeed in reforming Soviet society. Robert Gates,
No. 2 at the National Security Council, asserted in a speech and
article in the Washington Post that "our view of the Soviet Union
cannot be based on the personalities of its leaders but on the
nature of the Soviet system itself. We face a deeply entrenched
philosophy and system of government that has depended on repression
at home and promoted aggression beyond its borders. Gorbachev is
challenging some aspects of this system, but even he acknowledges
he has not yet significantly changed it."

    Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney went further, asserting in a
TV interview that "if I had to guess today, I would guess that
(Gorbachev) would ultimately fail . . . to reform the Soviet
economy" and "when that happens, he's likely to be replaced by
somebody who will be far more hostile . . . toward the West." In
an interview with TIME, an irritated Shevardnadze responded by
calling Cheney's statement "incompetent." Bush and Baker promptly
disassociated themselves from Cheney's remarks; both stressed that
the U.S. wants to see perestroika succeed. In fact, the
Gates-Cheney skepticism about Gorbachev's prospects have more
support in the White House than either the President or the
Secretary of State can let on publicly. And according to Western
intelligence, Gorbachev's security detail has been beefed up
recently, possibly out of a growing concern for his safety.

    Baker agreed with an NSC recommendation that in Moscow he
should reject any Soviet pleas to promote a compromise settlement
between the Soviet-backed Afghan government and the U.S.-backed
rebels. Washington insists on continuing to supply arms to the
rebel mujahedin, even though the U.S. has achieved its goal of
getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Moscow denounces the U.S.
policy as a violation of the Geneva accords under which the Kremlin
pulled out its troops.

    Most important, the Administration clung stubbornly to its
refusal to begin negotiations with the Soviets on reducing
short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. West Germany, where most of
the 88 U.S. Lance missile launchers are situated -- and where many
of the missiles would explode in wartime -- has virtually demanded
that the U.S. begin "early" negotiations. The Germans have enough
support to force a serious split within NATO if the U.S. continues
to say no. Britain, the Netherlands and Turkey support the U.S.,
while Bonn has the backing of Italy, Greece and most of the other
continental European countries; others, including Norway and
Canada, are trying to broker a compromise. But Bush is unmoved. He
reaffirmed his position in talks with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro
Harlem Brundtland last week, and again last Friday in a telephone
conversation with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

    The U.S., said the President, fears that in any negotiations
it would come under irresistible pressure to agree to a total ban
on nuclear weapons in Europe. NATO forces would then have no way
to beat back a possible invasion by the Warsaw Pact nations, given
the Pact's superiority in conventional forces. While that advantage
is impressive in numerical terms, many experts in the U.S. and
Western Europe argue that both in morale and materiel, Warsaw Pact
troops are highly overrated. Nevertheless, the Administration is
intent upon upgrading U.S. defenses in Europe by replacing the
75-mile-range Lance with new missiles that could be fired almost
four times as far, an idea the Kohl government strenuously opposes.

    This stand last week cost Bush the support of one of the
nation's most respected arms experts. Paul Nitze, a Reagan special
adviser on arms control who had just retired from the Government,
told the New York Times that the U.S. demand for modernization of
Lance missiles, together with the refusal to negotiate on
short-range weapons, was "politically impossible for much of
Europe." He added, "I cannot think of a German who would agree to
that. Many of the allies think it is a crazy proposition." Nitze
pointed out that NATO could benefit from successful talks because
the Soviets have 1,600 short-range missile warheads in Europe to
600 for the U.S.

    In Congress too influential voices are calling for
negotiations. Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn
last week proposed a U.S. commitment to negotiate in return for
three conditions: the West Germans would agree not to reduce all
the way to zero; no actual reductions would be made until the
outcome of talks on conventional arms becomes clear; and Bonn would
accept modernization of whatever Lance force remains.

    The President and his advisers say they are annoyed because
only a month earlier, Kohl won a grudging U.S. agreement to put off
a decision on Lance modernization until after the West German
elections in 1990. But the Chancellor's popularity at home has
sagged recently, and his center-right coalition is threatened by
discontent over widely criticized tax and health reforms. In an
almost desperate attempt to regain ground, he has adopted the
negotiate-now attitude of the Social Democratic opposition and of
his coalition partner, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.
When Kohl sent two ministers to Washington to explain his reversal,
they were met icily, even though Kohl has long been the West German
politician closest to Washington.

    The bad feeling is mutual; many West Germans suspect that any
war would wreak nuclear devastation on West German territory if the
U.S. fired the short-range missiles, rather than risking Soviet
retaliation against American cities by launching long-range nukes
against targets inside the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there is a
growing belief that some kind of compromise will be found in time
to permit a show of unity at a NATO summit meeting in Brussels May
29-30. The "early" negotiations the West Germans want could be put
off until next year or even later; Bonn might also agree to some
of Nunn's conditions, notably that any reductions negotiated would
not take effect until separate talks under way in Vienna yield an
agreement eliminating or at least lessening the Warsaw Pact's
superior numbers in conventional troops and weapons. The West
Germans have begun talking of the hoariest of all dodges: appoint
a NATO committee to study what line to take toward short-range
missile negotiations.

    Even if the specific controversy is swept under the rug for a
while, a deeper problem will remain. Political expediency is only
one reason for the West German pressure for negotiations. Another
is the deep conviction of many West Germans, including Foreign
Minister Genscher, that Gorbachev's efforts to democratize Soviet
society and reach an accommodation with the West have drastically
lessened the likelihood of Soviet attack. With that fear largely
gone, Genscher believes, the U.S. and its allies have a
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to bring down the barriers that have
divided Europe since 1945; the Western nations must seize that
opportunity by putting forward initiatives of their own and
engaging the Soviets in negotiations whenever possible. Moscow
scored further public relations points last week when its Hungarian
allies conspicuously started dismantling the barbed wire along the
border with Austria. Only a week earlier, the Soviets had
unilaterally -- and very overtly -- withdrawn 31 heavy tanks from
Hungary. Though Genscher's stand on the Lance missiles is bitterly
opposed by some allies, especially Britain, he speaks in the
broader context for a constituency that reaches far beyond the Bonn
government, and for that matter beyond Germany and even Europe.

    Bush's advisers have a different view. They point to recent
Soviet sales of bombers to Libya as a sign of a continued Kremlin
penchant for mischief-making. Gates, in particular, suspects that
Gorbachev, like Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev before him,
is cozying up to the West to get technical aid that would help him
stave off economic collapse. If that can be accomplished, Gates
fears, Gorbachev will return to a menacing approach.

    Other advisers argue that Gorbachev is under heavy pressure to
make more and more concessions, almost regardless of what the U.S.
does. In this view, the Soviet leader has no overarching long-range
scheme but is making up policy day to day. "In many cases,
Gorbachev does not really know what he plans to do," says an
intelligence official. "He is stirring the stew, creating
opportunities for new solutions, without what we would really like
to know as a long-range plan." Consequently, these advisers think,
the Soviet leader is putting pressure on himself to go ever
farther; every time he makes a concession without noticeably
reducing tension with the West, he feels it necessary to top
himself with another move that might have more impact.

    The conclusion of one policymaker: "That ad hoc approach gives
us lots of opportunities if we play our cards right" -- which
essentially means waiting Gorbachev out. He adds that if the U.S.
were to make a dramatic proposal now, say on disarmament, the
Soviet leader could easily trump it: "Because of the massive
imbalance, particularly in conventional forces, he can always top
us."

    There are other less intellectual reasons for the wait-and-see
policy. Like any Republican President, Bush must keep his right
wing placated. Some critics also think that, in Nitze's words, Bush
is determined to demonstrate that his Administration "is not really
a follow on to the Reagan Administration." One senior official
indicates these critics might have a point: "Reagan's willingness
at Reykjavik to eliminate all nuclear weapons scared the hell out
of Bush and was a big influence on him." Bush, this source asserts,
"became determined that if he was President, he would restore
tough-mindedness and perspective" to U.S.-Soviet relations.

    In its baldest form, a U.S. policy to take advantage of Soviet
weakness, even at the risk of Gorbachev's failure and replacement
by a more hostile successor, might have a self-fulfilling aspect
-- just as Brezhnev's more aggressive adventurism helped destroy
detente a decade ago. The U.S. would be foolish to dismantle its
defenses on the basis of Soviet promises yet to be borne out, but
no one is asking a superpower with a military budget of nearly $300
billion to do that.

    The real danger is that the U.S., in taking a purely reactive
attitude, will undermine its own interests by continuing to leave
all the initiatives to Gorbachev. He has abundantly proved himself
a virtuoso in wooing public opinion in Western Europe -- and for
that matter, in the U.S. Without a goal, Washington could lurch
erratically from facile toughness to accommodation as the President
makes ad hoc compromises. Worst of all, the U.S. really might miss
a historic opportunity to lessen the danger of nuclear war that has
dominated the second half of the 20th century. In some ways, a
smiling Soviet leader who speaks of peace and fellowship poses a
greater challenge to U.S. leadership than a rocket-rattling
blusterer. George Bush has not yet figured that out, nor come close
to providing the leadership required to keep the Western alliance
truly strong.


-- Dan Goodgame and Christopher Ogden/Washington and James O.
   Jackson/Bonn